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with.” (196–197)8 This may seem evident to Thomasson, but why should anybody with
an opposite feeling about the ordinary talk about numbers agree?
As mentioned in connection with several chapters of the book there is a large gap
concerning the linguistic-philosophical foundations of both, the Easy Approach and some
of the criticism towards other approaches. The application conditions represent just one
(cluster of) concept(s) and compared to other concepts (!) it is rather clearly sketched. In
contrast, the relation between reference and existence remains deeply enigmatic. Another
example are the conditions for new concepts (and easy arguments) in chapter eight. –
This decit of the book could be compensated for by a global reference to a thorough
introduction to these issues, though a couple of chapters devoted solely to the linguistic-
philosophical infrastructure might have served that purpose as well. As it stands the book
cannot be considered self-contained. This also goes to show that with all these fundamental
but extra-ontological issues left open the Easy Approach might not be as easy as one
expects – though still easier than the demanding approaches.
Despite the shortcomings and as pointed out above, the book is an achievement. The
number of foes it legitimately criticizes is just too high to not deserve a benevolent reading
that extends to the presentation of the Easy Approach, a discussion of its constructive
and destructive merits with regard to all referred approaches to ontology, and ultimately
recognition of some central aspects of the Easy Approach. Of course, this assessments
makes it more of a work in progress than the author may have intended, but this is not bad
at all because it may help the issue to be discussed longer into the future.
Study of the book is especially recommended for those who seek to reect on their meta-
ontological presumptions before, after, or while working in ontology. Not being opposed
to all uses of ordinary language should be seen as a precondition if the reader wants to
keep her temper. Awareness of philosophical methods and especially the knowledge of
concepts from the philosophy of language should be regarded as obligatory so as to assess
Thomasson’s arguments without solely relying on her convictions. If this condition is met,
the book may even serve as an introductory text, albeit a biased one, which presents various
contemporary approaches to ontology by reference to representative adherents to these
approaches. In teaching, the book or its chapters may serve the purpose of a basis for
discussion in advanced courses. A supplementation with other texts for parallel discussion
is recommended.
Dr. Moritz Cordes, Universität Greifswald
Sandra Lapointe (ed.): Themes from Ontology, Mind, and Logic: Present and Past –
Essays in Honour of Peter Simons. Grazer Philosophische Studien 91. Leiden/Boston:
Brill Rodopi, 2015, viii + 442 pages, ISBN 978-90-04-30224-2
The publication under review is a festschrift honouring Peter Simons and his contributions
to philosophy, on the occasion of his 65th birthday. Through his 40 years long career,
Peter Simons has made considerable contributions to the eld of philosophy. Through
hundreds of papers, and a few books, he has enriched our understanding of a multitude
8 Another issue with regard to which the ontologically interested reader will be at a loss are incomplete application
conditions (204).
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of subjects. His historical work on Austrian and Polish philosophers has provoked much
deserved attention among philosophers upon two hitherto neglected traditions and their
numerous philosophers. His historical work on the origins of analytic philosophy and of
logic has integrated the Austrian and Polish traditions with work on canonical gures such
as Frege and Wittgenstein. Simons’ systematic work, covering the elds of pure and applied
ontology, philosophy of science, and philosophical logic, builds to a large degree upon
this historical foundation, yet through his original insights he makes the resultant theories
distinctively his own. Of the most well-known amongst these are his pioneering work
on truth-makers (Mulligan, Simons & Smith 1984), his foundational work on mereology
(Simons 1987), and his defence of an ontology of tropes (Simons 1994). An especially
prominent feature of his work is his employment of logical resources (in many cases
revived and developed by him) to issues in ontology.
The sixteen papers in the festschrift cover a good part of the subjects of which Simons
has worked upon; the majority of which deal with pure and applied ontology while a
minority deal with philosophy of mind and philosophical logic. A few of the papers also
engage critically with Simons’ own work. Many of the contributors have previously worked
directly with Simons, either as collaborators or students, while others have been strongly
inuenced by Simons’ work. Most of the papers, as well as the preface by the editor,
contain an introductory remark (often in a footnote) with details on the authors’ relations
to Simons and the occasional anecdote. For reasons of space, I regret that I am unable to
discuss all papers in depth, although I at the very least give a brief summary of them. Note
that numbers alone in round brackets refer to pages of the publication under review.
I Ontology
Kathrin Koslicki’s paper “In Defense of Substance” defends an Aristotelian concept of
substance against Simons’ attack on this metaphysical concept (Simons 1998). Koslicki
shows that on the whole Simons’ characterization of substances is similar to Aristotle’s
in the Categories, and then she enumerates Simons’ main objections to substance. Rather
than answering these objections, Koslicki instead argues that certain distinctions should
be drawn, in fact the very distinctions that Aristotle himself draws in Metaphysics Z.
Especially relevant is Aristotle’s introduction of hylomorphism, the theory that substances
(e. g. Socrates) are further analyzable into form and matter, their more explanatory basic
constituents. Koslicki herself argues elsewhere (Koslicki 2008) that form and matter are
proper parts of the hylomorphic compound, but she emphasizes (rightly I think) that
acceptance of this highly controversial view is unnecessary for the argument of this paper.
Her point is that even if one accepts the characterization of substances in the Categories
as that which is neither ‘said of’ (e. g. human is said of Socrates) nor ‘present in’ (e. g. a
paleness is present in Socrates) something else9, viz. that substance is the ultimate subject
9 I must note that I nd Koslicki’s presentation (68–69) of the ontological square (cf. Mulligan, Simons & Smith
1984 for a succinct account) somewhat peculiar, as she does not mention that which is both ‘said of’ and ‘present
in’ a subject (i. e. the upper right corner of the square). As a result she, in my mind erroneously, equates ‘said
of’ with essential predication and ‘present in’ with accidental predication. Admittedly, there is some controversy
among Aristotle-scholars as to how to understand the category of what is only ‘present in’ a subject (especially
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of predication, one can still accept that further explanatory analysis can be provided of
substances. To illuminate this point, Koslicki distinguishes between two roles that the term
‘substance’ can play in metaphysics. (A) This is, rst, a taxonomic role, in setting up a
catalogue of existentially committing entities in the fashion of Quine. (B) Second, it plays
a non-taxonomic role, attaching priority and importance to certain types of entities. I nd
this terminology quite confusing, since the non-taxonomic role seems to presuppose the
taxonomic, and because a typical taxonomy is not a loose catalogue but rather an ordered
structure. Substance in its taxonomic role is argued to be the same as Simons’ everyday
substances, while in its non-taxonomic role it is argued to largely overlap with Simons’
metaphysical substances. Both of these roles, she argues, are found in Aristotle’s discussion
in the Categories. In addition, through the distinction between absolute substancehood
(substance simpliciter), relational substancehood (x substance of y), and comparative
substancehood (x more substance than y), she constructs a plausible interpretation of the
different ways a substance, its form, and its matter is said to be substance. In her paper
Koslicki succeeds in highlighting the numerous different ways in which a concept of
substance can be applied, and thus she shows that Simons’ objections only hold against one
of these concepts of substance. She does not, however, prove that a concept of substance is
indispensable for metaphysics, and there is no reason why Simons, or anyone else, might
not nd just as good objections against all of these other variants of substance. Koslicki
has shown that debates about substance will persist, but in the end (to the chagrin of the
present author and any other friend of substances) Simons might end up being right that
substance belongs to a bygone age and is obsolete.
In his paper “On Basic Modes of Being: Metaphysical Reections in Light of Whitehead,
Husserl, Ingarden, Hintikka” David Woodruff Smith merges together different theories
from these four philosophers. From Whitehead he takes the idea of a process as algorithmic,
such that the process is ontologically dependent upon a concrescence structure. He then
identies this structure with Husserl’s ‘manifold’, such that a process’s concrescence
structure denes its way of becoming, namely a formal process dening it in its ontological
space. Returning to Whitehead, a process is dened both in terms of prehended processes
and prehended forms or properties (‘prehended’ being a technical term Whitehead uses for
the connection between an event and its antecedents). Smith thinks concrescence structures
can be seen as patterns of dependence, and illuminated through Ingarden’s modes of being.
However, whereas Ingarden has four (main) modes of being (cf. Thomasson 2012 and
Johansson 2013), Smith has seven – and of these seven only two are among Ingarden’s
modes (the real and the ideal), and two are among Ingarden’s existential moments which
constitutes his modes (being actual, being necessary). Further, Smith has ontological
dependence as a mode of being, while Ingarden denes his modes in terms of several
existential moments where each pair (or quadruple) captures distinct types of dependence
(and independence). I would prefer to keep these distinctions apart, especially as Smith’s
argument centres around dependence, and later in the paper he indeed distinguishes some
kinds of dependence (234–235) although they are not Ingarden’s distinctions (instead
Smith builds on Husserl’s notion of founding viz. ontological grounding). It is also far
whether this is to be understood as tropes). But I cannot see how simply fusing the category of ‘present in’ (e. g.
this redness) with the category of both ‘present in’ and ‘said of’ (e. g. Redness), which as far as I can see is what
Koslicki does, in any way can be an acceptable solution.
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from clear to me how Smith arrives at his seven modes of being. It also seems problematic
that each mode is connected to an existential moment which is the instantiation of that
mode. For instance, the mode of being which he calls “being thus-and-so [. . .] the way
universals are instantiated in particulars” would seem to give rise to something like Plato’s
Third Man. Socrates instantiating Human would again be an existential moment, which
in turn would instantiate the mode ‘being thus-and-so’. But then, wouldn’t the existential
moment ‘‘Socrates instantiating Human’ instantiating the mode ‘being thus-and-so’’ be
an existential moment, which also would instantiate the mode ‘being thus-and-so’; and
from there one would have an innite regress of instantiation-relations between ever more
complex existential moments. But perhaps Smith has a ready answer to this objection.
Smith’s paper contains many more interesting suggestions and discussions, and my brief
presentation has only scratched the surface.
In her article “Computer-generated Music, Authorship, and Work Identity” Maria Elis-
abeth Reicher argues, pace Simons 1988, that the case of computer-generated music is
not a good reason to abandon the concept of a musical work. Her argument relies upon
a detailed ontology of art (defended in more detail in Reicher 1998a, 1998b, and 2003),
where this ontology, like Simons’ own theory, is heavily inuenced by Ingarden. Reicher
follows Ingarden in dening art works as abstract objects that can be instantiated in many
concrete particulars. This ontology is in and of itself highly interesting, although some
gure or other pictorial representation would have been of much help to the reader. For
her present argument, the concepts of authorship and concretisation are especially relevant.
(A) Authors create at a particular time an art work (as an abstract type) through determining
in an intentional act the internal properties (like its key and rhythm, not the name of its
author and date of creation) of the work. (B) Authors leave certain internal properties of
the art work indeterminate, and the determination of these properties (e. g. by a conductor
and his orchestra) are the concretisations (again through an intentional act) of works in
their own rights with the conductor etc. as co-authors together with the composer. Given
this ontology, Reicher rules out the possibility that the computer or the computer program
could author a musical work (pace e. g. Dennett 2013: 265–266) – because a computer
or a computer program is not capable of intentional acts, viz. mental processes. Similarly,
the possibility of a work without an author is ruled out. That leaves the possibility that the
programmer is the sole author, or the possibility that the user is the sole author; or what
Reicher takes to hold for the majority of cases, namely that the programmer and the user
are co-authors. I nd her conclusions plausible, and I am very much sympathetic to them,
but I suppose her ontology of art to be quite controversial and her arguments here will
derivatively be likewise.
II Ontology and Logic
Benjamin Schnieder defends the asymmetry of ‘because’, in a paper with that exact
title, not only through responding to seven10 types of counterexamples, but also through
sketching out an account of why ‘because’ is asymmetrical. Schnieder initially considers
the possibility that an account can be given in terms of explanatory speech acts, or in terms
10 Schnieder’s counterexamples are ordered from ‘a’ to ‘h’, however there is no counterexample named ‘e’.
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of being irreexive and transitive, but rejects both of these alternatives. Instead, he suggests
that an Aristotelian semantics of ‘because’ can account for the asymmetry. The basic idea
of this account is that ‘because’ “tracks relations of objective priority” (142), and “priority
relations are asymmetrical by their nature” (ibid.). These priority relations differ in sort, and
I understand Schnieder as mentioning efcient causes (“be causal”, ibid.), material causes
(“concern what things consist of”, ibid.) and formal causes (“the essences of things”,
ibid.), while the fourth kind of Aristotle’s a t–a, the teleological, has been left out.11
Aristotle’s a t–a seems to combine causation (in a very broad sense encompassing all four
a t–a), explanation (as over-emphasized by Hocutt 1974), and objective (as contrasted with
temporal) priority. Schnieder’s suggestion that objective priority is the basic sense of a t–a
is highly interesting. It might also be possible to give an analogous account of the relation
between the broad Aristotelian sense of causation (or, for that matter, of metaphysical
causation as used in the grounding-literature) and objective priority, even though Schnieder
himself does not hint at the possibility. Schnieder also notes that metaphysical grounding
can be “one of those priority relations supporting because-claims” (143). A small note
of criticism to the paper is its overly modest conclusion – Schnieder does not give a
mere “modest defence of the asymmetry thesis” (160), and his proposed account not just
“seemed workable” (161). He gives a very solid defence, and his proposed account will,
once it is worked out a bit more in detail, be a very promising account.
In his paper “Logical Grounding and First-Degree Entailments”, Fabrice Correia argues
that Anderson and Belnap’s rst-degree entailments are closely connected to weak ground-
ing, and he presents the logical system FDE with its three variations corresponding to three
types of logical grounding (weak, strict, and strict*).
“How to Speak of Existence: A Brentanian Approach to (Linguistic and Mental) Onto-
logical Commitment” by Uriah Kriegel defends a Brentanian notion of existence. Under
this notion, existence is no property of any sort belonging to the existing object, but rather
an attitudinal property belonging to a mental state which is directed toward that object –
namely the mental state of belief in the object, e. g. belief in cats and disbelief in ghosts
(102).
Jan Wolen´ski’s paper “An Analysis of Logical Determinism” argues against the view of
Schlick and Waismann that logic (viz. the law of excluded middle and for Schlick also the
law of contradiction) entail logical determinism. He does, however, accept Łukasiewicz’
assumption that bivalence and the principle of causality together are logically equivalent to
radical determinism, yet he argues that the principle of causality is not a logical principle
and therefore it can be logically proven that the views of Schlick and Waismann are wrong.
III Numbers as multitudes, and mereological issues
In his paper “Collections as One-and-Many – On the Nature of Numbers”, Ingvar Johans-
son critically discusses Simons’ view that the natural numbers are properties of multitudes.
Simons takes multitudes to differ from both sets and mereological sums, in that a multitude
11 Schnieder also refers to Posterior Analytics I 3, where Aristotle discusses the demonstration of the posterior
from the prior (and where the prior may be indemonstrable and sui generis). The relationship between Aristotle’s
Posterior Analytics and his a t–a (especially the formal cause) are still in need of further research.
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is nothing but its members. Further, Simons takes numbers to be non-distributive properties,
such that the property is not possessed by the members of the multitude separately; and
numbers are formal properties, in the sense that multitudes of e. g. concrete particulars, or
abstract objects, or mental states, can have this property. Johansson accepts the basics of Si-
mons’ view, with two minor exceptions; Johansson is a realist about properties and accepts
ctional objects. However, Johansson wants to defend the view Husserl develops in the
Philosophy of Arithmetic (dismissed by Simons) that multitudes are the result of cognitive
combination and abstraction. Still, Johansson argues that both Husserl and Simons have
overlooked two facts, and Johansson himself defends an in-between position combining
aspects from both Husserl and Simons. The rst of these is that a multitude functions both
as many and as one (as one in the foreground and as many in the background, or vice
versa), and is thus best apprehended as one-and-many. The second of these is that multi-
tudes have virtual articial boundaries, which have the status of social facts (and are thus
real, following Searle’s analysis). Applying these two points, Johansson gives plausible
accounts of single-member multitudes (where pace Simons such cases are not seen as
degenerate), addition and multiplication (argued to be cases of boundary-reconstruction),
and irrational numbers (argued to be proportion-relations between properties). In sum, this
is a highly original paper on the nature of numbers, which gives deserved attention to both
Husserl’s and Simons’ underappreciated theories.
“Non-Transitive Parthood, Leveled Mereology, and the Representation of Emergent Parts
of Processes” by Johanna Seibt argues for a basic non-transitive relation of parthood, which
she names ‘belonging with’. Classical mereology presupposes the ‘myth of the substance’
whereby (among others) a thing is equivocated with the spatial region it occupies, Seibt
argues, and this myth hides the fact that spatial parthood is non-transitive. To illustrate the
uses of the ‘belonging with’-relation Seibt sketches a Leveled Mereology (LEM), where
LEM allows for feedback loops (viz. a whole can “be part of . . . part of itself”; p. 178) and
entanglement of processes (e. g. the burning candle melts the wax and percolates it within
the wick so that the candle burns and so on). Although Seibt herself defends a process
ontology elsewhere, much of her argument in this paper seems to be compatible with an
ontology containing both processes and substances (e. g. the Basic Formal Ontology, cf.
Smith 2012), and her paper could thus have application beyond process ontologies.
Theodore Sider’s paper “Nothing Over and Above” discusses several views on the
relationship between a whole and its parts. First, he rejects Kit Fine’s theory of summative
identity (Fine 2010), both because it does not imply weak supplementation and because it,
prima facie, is unable to deal with a counterexample presented by Sider (202–3). Second,
he rejects the ‘composition-as-identity’ view, because it does not imply any principles of
classical mereology. Third, he rejects the number-indifference view, in which the distinction
between singulars and plurals is abandoned, because of an objection involving an x with
no proper parts whereby this x seems to be objectively one. Fourthly, he discusses the view
that it is not the parts and the whole that is identical, but rather the fact that the parts exist
is identical with the fact that the whole exist. Sider says that this view captures much of
the rhetorical force behind the slogan that the whole is nothing over and above the parts,
yet it misses the target of explaining the relationship between a whole and its parts (at
most one can deny that there is such a relationship, e. g. because there is no whole). Lastly,
Sider suggests that classical mereology might be able to explain the relationship, because
unrestricted composition is an axiom of classical mereology, although this sui generis
224 Book Reviews – Buchbesprechungen
explanation might be found wanting for some. All in all, the results of this paper are mostly
negative, and it could perhaps have beneted from discussing some of Simons’ own views
on the question.
IV Truth; Twardowski, Bolzano, and von Wright
In her paper “The Things We Call True”, Maria van der Schaar argues that there are two
problems with Simons’ account of truth-bearers (in Simons 2003 and 2008): (A) the truth-
bearers are too diverse (viz. judgement, understanding, assumption, assertions), and cannot,
as Simons argues, be grouped together as propositions. (B) It is unclear what a true act of
understanding means. Van der Schaar thinks this calls for a different account, specically
an account closer to Twardowski’s. However, while Twardowski distinguished between
the act of judgement and the judgement made, van der Schaar adds a third notion, which
she calls the judgement candidate. She gives the example of a person dancing (analogous
to the act of judgement), the danced dance (analogous to the judgement made), and a
choreography (analogous to the judgement candidate). In her discussion of choreography,
there are some overlaps with Reicher’s paper (a choreography and a musical score are
both art works). Further, van der Schaar applies Aristotle’s threefold distinction between
the potential to attain a potential, having a potential, and actualizing that potential (cf.
De Anima 417a21-b1), and thus she arrives at a vefold distinction of judgement (316).
I am uncertain to what extent Simons himself would nd the criticism of his position
compelling, and I am even more uncertain if he would nd van der Schaar’s alternative to
be acceptable (although her rejection of the Platonism inherent in Frege’s Gedanke would,
I think, nd a sympathetic ear in Simons).
The paper by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, “Bolzano’s Denition of Analytic Propo-
sitions”, argues that Bolzano’s denition of analyticity has denite advantages over the
Frege-Quine denition. For Bolzano, propositions-in-themselves have the property of ana-
lyticity if they contain at least one idea inessentially (i. e. an idea which can be interchanged
with another idea without changing the proposition’s truth-value). The main advantage of
Bolzano’s denition is that it is free of epistemological notions. The authors gradually, in
the face of several prima facie problems, expand upon Bolzano’s basic denition, and in the
end with the fourth modication they settle on a denition involving Bolzano’s denition
together with two additions: (A) it is always true (or always false), and (B) through un-
derstanding the open sentence (this is the authors modication of Bolzano’s propositions-
in-themselves) it is recognizable by anyone that the open sentence is analytic. This last
addition brings into the denition an epistemological notion, whereas the main advantage
of Bolzano’s denition was that it was free of epistemological notions. To improve on this
situation the authors tentatively suggest that “a properly non-epistemic notion of analyticity
must [. . .] nd use for the notion of grounding [. . .]” (352).
“On Having a Property. Corrigenda in Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre” by Wolfgang
Künne discusses Bolzano’s preference for the schema ‘Socrates has courage’ in favour
of the schema ‘Socrates is courageous’. Künne takes Bolzano’s reasons for this pref-
erence to be inconclusive, and aims to settle this problem conclusively. On Bolzano’s
preferred schema, ‘has’ functions as a connector between an object (Socrates) and a prop-
erty (courage). Künne notes that Bolzano is here ambiguous, in that the property can either
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be an adherence12 (e. g. Socrates’ courage) or an ascribable attribute (e. g. Courage), which
can be predicated of several objects.13 As a result, the connector ‘has’ is also ambiguous:
if it relates an adherence, then the relation is irreexive, asymmetrical, and intransitive;
whereas if it relates an attribute, it is partim-reexive (i. e. neither reexive nor irreexive),
partim-symmetrical, and partim-transitive (390). Künne suggests that the decisive factor
in deciding between an adherence reading and an attribute reading is compatibility with
Bolzano’s denition of truth, and he argues that only an attribute reading is thus compatible.
Edgar Morscher’s paper “The Logic of Truth” presents von Wright’s Quanticational
Truth-Logic, argues that it has severe shortcomings (and even that von Wright “corrupted
his own intuitions” (420)), yet that these shortcomings can be corrected through the ex-
emption of sentences which are insensitive to truth-values.
V Meinong, Husserl, and Entertaining
Both the paper by Kevin Mulligan, “Annehmen, Phantasieren und Entertaining. Husserl
und Meinong”, and by Mark Textor, “Meaning, Entertaining, and Phantasy Judgement”,
discuss Meinong’s (and Mulligan also discusses Husserl’s) theory of assumption, imag-
ination, phantasy judgement, and entertaining. The two papers nicely complement each
other. Mulligan’s paper is primarily historical (although some comparisons to competing
views are made in the conclusion), and the theories of Meinong and Husserl are explicated
through extensive quotes and discussion. Whereas Textor argues that the application of
Meinong’s theory can solve a basic problem of the intensional semantics of Marty and
Grice, namely the problem that it fails in those cases where the audience judges the speaker
to be untruthful – which was not the judgement that the speaker intended the audience to
make. Textor argues that the speaker’s intended effect is a phantasy judgement, and that
this phantasy judgement is under the control of the speaker.
VI Concluding Remarks
A minor deciency of the volume is that there are quite a few typographical errors,
especially concerning references, although no single author is particularly to blame for this.
Its high-quality papers will be of interest to researchers across many elds of philosophy,
and many of the papers do not presuppose too much from the reader and are thus accessible
to non-experts, although I would not recommend the volume to undergraduate students. The
festschrift is a tting tribute to Peter Simons’ many invaluable contributions to philosophy
of which, I hope, there are still many more to come.14
12 Adherences, Künne argues with conviction, ”suffer from being called ‘tropes’ by Anglophone ontologists [. . .]”
(375 n. 25; cf. also Strawson 2011: 200–201).
13 Cf. Mulligan et al. 1984 for a succinct presentation of this distinction.
14 I would like to thank Ludger Jansen and Markus Schrenk for very helpful comments.
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